Strategies of Cooperation: Control and Commitment in Mega-Projects

Abstract

Public private partnerships are increasingly popular within infrastructure projects. Public administrations and private companies work together in order to successfully realize complex projects. One of the central themes of inter-organizational cooperation in projectbased alliances is the control-versus-commitment dilemma. The autonomy of a project organization and the authorization of partners are central in this dilemma, claim Child and Faulkner (1998). When dominant control is exercised by the project organization it involves risks of partners losing commitment to the project. Mega-projects involve a high degree of uncertainty, risk, and complexity; a mixture that is not ideal for hierarchical control (Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley and Marooszeky, 2002). This paper explores how the dilemma of control versus commitment has been dealt with in the Environ Mega-Project.